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Summary 
Many shipyards today contract vessels based on the traditional Lump Sum Fixed Price 
(LSFP) contract. Even though the construction of vessels from contract to delivery lasts from 
a year to longer, there are limited mechanisms available to mitigate for risk during the project 
evolution, especially in the case of prototype vessels, which are being built by the shipyard for 
the first time and include much uncertainty with regards to project drawings, detailed material 
lists and man-hours. Shipbuilding is definitely a large engineering construction project 
(LECP). Therefore it is logical to analyse how LECPs are contracted and managed in other 
industries which successfully minimize contract risk and constantly ensure profit in its 
business. In this paper two new shipbuilding-contracting models are presented and applied in 
a generic case study of contracting the newbuilding of a prototype vessel. The Cost Plus 
Incentive Fee (CPIF) and the Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contract models are demonstrated 
as improving the contracting process while yielding positive results for production, both in 
relation to the core capabilities of the shipyard as well as the sub-contracted activities in 
vessel production. Likewise a product work breakdown structure PWBS is shown as the 
model for shipyard business that very well complements the advanced contracting models. 
Finally a new contract risk analysis method using Monte Carlo simulation is developed to 
show how to practically analyse and compare the contracting methods in a case study so that 
shipyard management could choose the contracting model with the least amount of risk.   
Key words:  shipbuilding contracts; risk analysis; product work breakdown structure; 
Monte Carlo simulation. 
1. Introduction 
Today most shipyards sign contracts with ship-owners that can be defined as a “Lump 
Sum Fixed Price” (LSFP) contract [1] in which the total price of the vessel paid by the ship-
owner to the shipyard is defined along with milestone payments. However, since many 
European shipyards are moving away or have moved away from building standard tankers 
and bulkers to more high value added vessels with greater compensated gross tonnage (CGT) 
values, it is necessary to analyse and determine new contracting methods which will decrease 
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the risk of shipyards that want to engage in building prototype vessels different and more 
complex than the standard production program to date.    
The problem that many shipyards that are still contracting based on traditional LSFP 
contracts are that the risk sharing is not fairly distributed among the stakeholders in order to 
allow for the necessary competitiveness of the shipyard. Modern shipyards need to continue 
to analyse new methods of contracting which are more in line with a product work breakdown 
structure (PWBS) [2]. In the oil and gas processing industry, the construction of any type of a 
“Large Engineering Construction Project” (LECP) has already for some time used more 
advanced contracting methods between contractors and purchaser as well as sub-contractors 
and subliferaton, and this practice has successfully lead to profit gains in virtually all projects. 
Shipyards using traditional contracting methods on the other hand lack the necessary 
mechanisms to guarantee them earning a profit, which results in constant sustainability and 
future investments to insure constant advancements in the technology and methodology 
necessary to be competitive on the world stage [3]. When a contractual process negotiated by 
a shipyard does not follow modern negotiation methods, the result is often a “contractual 
disaster” [4]. Shipyards that do not produce large series of vessels but small product mixes 
need to consider abandoning traditional LFSP contract models and replacing them with newer 
contract types in order to be viable and survive in the competitive market place.   
This leads us to the analysis of the Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contract, where the 
shipyard is guaranteed a minimal profit along with an incentive for a greater profit shared 
with the owner. An alternative contract is the Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contract that is 
similar to a CPIF contract, with the exception that under a CPFF contract the shipyard is 
guaranteed a fixed profit with no additional cost incentive [1].  
In this paper the authors analysed the three different contract types in a generic case 
study based on the construction of a prototype vessel such as a factory stern trawler fishing 
vessel operating in extreme ice conditions. This represents a possible type construction in the 
future for shipyards since the need to preserve and process fish at sea in extreme Arctic 
conditions in order to increase the added value of the fishing industry at sea instead of relying 
on factories on the mainland. The trend is for the advancement of these types of high value 
added vessels [5]. However, since these vessels must have high autonomy in open seas as 
well as super ice class conditions, it is necessary for shipyards that have never built these 
vessels to analyse contracting models which will have both a positive strategic effect for the 
entire business while enabling minimal risk to both the shipyard and the owner, as well as 
enticing perspective sub-contractors and subliferation to be competitive in their bids. In order 
for the European shipbuilding industry to remain competitive it is necessary that the sub-
contractors and subliferation also partake in the risk. The risk distribution should be spread 
out fairly. Otherwise the decline of the shipyard, which is the primary contractor, will lead to 
the decline of the smaller shipbuilding sub-contractors. The proper and correct 
implementation of the contracting method will entice a Product work breakdown structure 
(PWBS) along with lean techniques to be engaged both at the strategic and tactical levels in 
the industry [6], [7].  
Finally, a new contract risk analysis method of the different contract types demonstrates 
how a generic inquiry for the construction of stern factory trawlers could result in an 
interesting project for all players in the industry. The owner, the shipyard and the prospective 
sub-contractors and subliferation as well as classification societies, equipment producers, 
outfitting and accommodations, engine maker, steel production are all key stakeholders in the 
shipbuilding industry. 
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2. Defining contract types 
As explained above the three contract types analyzed in this work include LSFP, CPIF 
and CPFF. Traditional shipyard sales departments estimate a fixed price for a newbuilding 
construction. Once the contract is signed, there are limited if any mechanisms for price 
adjustment favorable to the shipyard. This also means that there are no possibilities for the 
shipyard to increase its profit once the contract is signed. Therefore it is necessary to analyze 
methods, which allow for realistic and fair price adjustment. Especially since earning profit is 
the reason for shipyards to operate, and not relying on state subventions as is the case with 
many shipyards. The input variables in a contracting algorithm include the profit P, the target 
profit PT, the contract cost CC, the actual cost to build the vessel C, and the target cost 
calculated by the shipyard CT. In addition there is also a sharing factor “a” between the 
shipyard and owner. This factor determines the type of contract. Therefore the key equations 
can be expressed mathematically in equations (1) and (2) as follows [1]: 
)( CCaPP TT   (1) 
PCCC   (2) 
2.1 Lump Sum / Fixed Price (LSFP) contract  
The obligation for completing the ship is the sole responsibility of the shipyard given of 
course that the purchaser makes the milestone payments on time and according to schedule. 
The shipyard needs to include all types of perceivable risk such as unexpected costs that were 
not inherent in the calculation and estimation of the vessel cost. For instance fluctuations in 
material costs, and additional man-hours not planned in the contract estimate. At the same 
time, if the shipyard adds too much risk leeway in its bidding price, this may lead the owner 
to choose another shipyard with a lower price for the newbuilding instead. The estimation of 
the vessel cost includes the cost of materials, man-hours, depreciation costs and the profit. 
Given that the cost of materials stays the same as predicted during contract signing, and the 
production man-hours remain at the forecasted level, the shipyard could expect to earn a 
profit. If however, which is frequently the case for many shipyards, the cost of materials and 
production man-hours exceed the predicted shipyard estimates, then the profit becomes 
smaller. If the material costs and or production man-hours exceed the shipyard estimation at 
even higher levels, then the profit translates to a loss, and the shipyard will end up owning 
money instead of earning. In the LSFP contract the “sharing rate” “a” is always equal to 1. 
Therefore equation 1 above translates to equation (3) below [1]:  
)( CCPP TT   (3) 
TTC CPC   (4) 
Likewise, the contract cost Cc is equal to the sum of the target profit PT and the target 
cost CT both estimated by the shipyard sales department as demonstrated in equation (4) 
above. The situation with this type of a contract is that if the shipyard cost C of building the 
prototype vessel exceeds the cost estimated by the shipyard sales department CT, then the 
actual profit P in equation 3 will be lower than the target profit PT.     
Try to provide good quality figures, as you would wish them to look when published. 
Do not use embedded vector graphics because of possible side effects. Use raster graphics in a 
resolution not less than 300 dpi. Try to balance the figure size according to information you 
are trying to present to reader. Allow a small percentage of figure resizing for the sake of 
typesetting. 
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2.2 Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contract  
The advantages of a CPIF contract are that they make it the shipyard’s prerogative to 
bring the costs to a minimum by enticing efficiency in production and procurement of 
materials.  Therefore, a shipyard, which is building a prototype stern trawler factory vessel 
with unrestricted voyage for the first time, could engage in this risk. The owner is realistic to 
the shipyard making a profit and for all costs to be covered. In return, the owner has the 
opportunity to minimize shipbuilding costs. The contract cost CC is known upon the 
completion of the vessel. If the actual cost C is less than the target cost CT of the vessel, then 
the sharing rate agreed upon between the owner and the shipyard is between 0 and 1. For 
instance, if the sharing rate is 50 percent between the shipyard and the owner, then “a” is 0,5.  
The shipyard is guaranteed a profit PT that is the target profit given that the shipyard meets 
certain minimal requirements. Likewise the shipyard has a right to the sharing rate “a”. The 
owner takes over all of the risk if the shipyard meets “performance criteria” such as quality, 
delivery on time, and safety.  There is a “cost performance incentive” for the shipyard if the 
actual cost is less than the target cost CT.  We go back to equation (1) regarding the profit.  If 
the actual cost is greater than the target cost, then the sharing rate “a” is 0 and the shipyard 
receives the target profit.  This is mathematically explained by equation (5) below.   
TPP   (5) 
If however, the actual cost is less than the target cost, then equation 1 is valid. 
Additionally, equation 6 mathematically explains the cost related profit. The shipyard is 
guaranteed a profit PT and there is a chance for cost related profit PC is mathematically 
defined by equation (6) [1]:  
)( CCaP TC   (6) 
The total profit received by the shipyard is as equation 1 above.  
2.3 Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPIF) contract  
With the Cost Plus Fixed (CPFF) contract, the shipyard is guaranteed a profit from the 
owner.  The actual cost of building the ship has no effect on the profit of the shipyard [8]. In a 
CPFF contract the owner pays the shipyard a fixed fee (profit).  The owner reimburses the 
shipyard for all costs associated with building of the ship shown in equation (7) below [1]: 
CPCC   (7)   
The contract cost Cc or the cost of the owner to the shipyard is equal to the profit P which 
is constant plus the actual cost of building the ship C determined upon delivery.  The contract 
between the owner and the shipyard relates effectively to the delivery of services required in 
building a ship as opposed to delivering a vessel. Therefore in this contract model the 
shipyard has the least risk, while the profit negotiated with the owner is certain but usually 
limited.  
3. Stochastic simulation of the different contracts 
Since there is much uncertainty in determing contract prices, the authors have decided to 
apply stochastic simulation as a reliable method of testing different contract types. Based 
upon previous research in production man-hours where there is much uncertainty, the authors 
have decided to apply Monte Carlo simulation integrated with the PERT distribution using the 
@RISK add-on for Excel by Palisades corporation since it allows for readily available inputs 
of least, most likely and greatest values [7], [9], [10].    
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3.1 PERT distribution 
The Program Evaluation Review Technique (PERT) distribution has similarities to the 
triangular distribution used in the past except that it is smoother around the ends and allows 
for realistic extreme values whereas the triangular distribution does not [11], [12]. The authors 
of this work decided to use the PERT distribution due to its history of more reliability when 
sampling parameters in a case study, since it maps out realistic industry man-hours and costs. 
Likewise the benefit in making use of three readily available paramters, minimum, maximum 
and most likely is practical for defining the distribution in a practical and effective manner 
[13].    
3.2 Monte Carlo Simulation 
The Monte Carlo method is used when it is not practical or impossible to compute an 
exact result with deterministic methods. There is no single Monte Carlo method; instead the 
term describes a large and widely-used class of approaches [14]. The authors adapted the 
Monte Carlo method to work with a PERT distribution in order to perform repeated sampling 
to determine the most likely outcomes in the contract price range adapted for shipbuilding 
contracts. The four main steps include: 
1) Defining inputs within a certain distribution such as PERT. 
2) Generating cost inputs randomly from the PERT distribution.  
3) Calculations using the PERT distribution. 
4) “Aggregating the results” of the individual computations into the final result [14]. 
The integration of the PERT distribution in the Monte Carlo simulation provides results, 
which allow shipyard management to make better decisions before choosing a final contract 
model.  Advancement in computers resulted in the development of pseudorandom number 
generators, which is key to Monte Carlo simulation becuase they are much faster to use than 
the tables of random numbers which had been previously used for statistical sampling [14].  
The advent of personal computers during the 1980s and its continuous improvement and 
accessibility till today in conjunction with readily available software means that all scientists, 
engineers and businessmen can find application of Monte Carlo methods.  
The Monte Carlo simulation process defines a probability distribution for each contract 
type cost. Combining the advantages of using the PERT distruibution in conjunction with a 
Monte Carlo simulation provided in the EXCEL @RISK add-in is the creation of a 
cumulative distribution function which illustrates the cost distribution in a realistic way. The 
EXCEL @RISK simulation tool works by picking a random contract cost from each 
distribution and uses that for the actual cost for the contract type. It does this for every task in 
the network 1000 times, until a probability distribution of possible outcomes is recorded. In 
this way Monte Carlo simulation provides a much more comprehensive view of what may 
happen, and how likely it is to happen [15], [16].   
In order to transform classical shipyards to modern and competitive ones,  shipyard 
management needs to make use of tools and methodologies to decrease uncertainties and  
business risk through making accurate and realistic predictions regarding production and 
financial outcomes. Consulting with experts from within the shipyard and with outside 
consultants will result in determining realistic minimum, maximum and most likely values for 
different scenarios and contract models.  Afterwards all three contracting models need to be 
analyzed. For the purposes of setting an example based on experience from Capital 
Contracting Services, Shell Global Solutions International  [1], it is necessary to consider one 
relevant example used in the contracting phase of Large Engineering Construction Projects 
(LECPs).   
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4. Generic case study 
The authors made use of the graph with three main contracting methods CPFF, CPIF and 
LSFP, used for the contracting of construction projects in the oil and gas industry. These 
graphs predict real world contract cost distributions. The y-axis is the cumulative probability, 
whereas the x-axis signifies the contract cost with 100 as a mean value (See Figure 1).   
 
Fig. 1 Contract types: (a) CPFF; (b) CPIF; (c) LSFP [1] 
By reading the minimum, maximum and mean values for each curve, Table 1 below 
was created for each contract type.  
Table 1  Berends curves converted to PERT variables  
Index Contract type Xmin Xmean Xmax 
A CPFF 40 106 165 




100 118 130 
The “c” curve represents the behaviour of a LSFP with hedging contract which has the 
least variation; the “b” curve represents a CPIF contract and “a” represents a CPFF contract 
with the largest minimum to maximum range. The x-axis represents the contract cost with 100 
being estimated as the most likely price for the engineering construction project. The y-axis 
represents the cumulative probability. The type of curves developed represents cumulative 
descending curves. The area under each of the curves always adds to 1. The authors decided 
to use this graph as a basis for performing a transformation for shipbuilding contracts since 
the oil and gas industry has much experience in both theoretical and practical analysis in the 
behaviour of contract types. Table 2 below is developed using the standard calculations for 
the theoretical values, and the experimental values from the Monte Carlo simulations using 
@RISK Palisades Corporation program for Excel [17]. 
In the hypothetical case study, the sales department of a shipyard estimates the cost of 
a prototype stern trawler vessel to be roughly 55 million USD.  The Xmin, X most likely and Xmax 
values are all numerically interpolated from Table 1. The theoretical variances and standard 
deviations are calculated using standard calculations from [17]. The experimental values are 
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received after performing the simulation using @RISK Palisade’s corporation software where 
the following command in equation (8) is used: 
               =RISKPERT (Lower bound value, Most likely value, Upper bound value)          
(8) 
Summary table for Monte Carlo analysis of a case study interpolated from the Figure 1 
curves [17]. 




Xmin Xmost likely Xmax   
   S2 
Theor. 
   S2 









USD x 10^6 
(USD x 
10^6)2 
USD x 10^6 
LSFP non 
hedging 




55 64,9 71,5 7,6 9,16 2,8 3,10 64,34 64,34 
CPIF  30,8 60,5 82,5 74,2 98,0 8,6 9,55 59,21 59,82 
CPFF 22 58,3 90,8 131,3 169,2 11,5 13,18 57,65 57,96 
 
“Xmin = lower bound value” 
“Xmax = upper bound value” 
“Xmost likely = most likely value” 
“s2 Theor. = theoretical variance explained in equation 3 above” 
“s Theor. = theoretical standard deviation explained in equation 4 above.” 
“s2 Exper. = experimental variance received from Monte Carlo simulation”  
“s Exper = experimental standard deviation received from Monte Carlo simulation” 
“ μ Exper. = experimental mean value obtained from Monte Carlo simulation” 
4.1 Monte Carlo Simulation Results 
For the LSFP non-hedging curve in the first row of table 2, where there is no possibility 
for price change, the variances and standard deviations are zero, while the experimental mean 
is the same as the theoretical mean of 55. This is because there are virtually no methods for 
changing the price of traditional LSFP contracts. The graphical results of the Monte Carlo 
simulation for the LSFP non-hedging curve are illustrated in Figure 2 below. The vertical 
straight line means that the area below the curve is zero. The LSFP curve with no hedging 
represents traditional lump sum contracting used in traditional shipbuilding contracts. All the 
risk lies with the shipyard. There is no way to make any price adjustments regardless of the 
market situation. This contract is very risky for the series production of vessels since just the 
cost of steel may vary from year to year. Likewise currency fluctuations may also result in 
negative financial situation for the shipyard, but also for the owner. 
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Fig. 2 Lump sum fixed price (LSFP) Curve with no hedging 
That is why it is necessary to analyze an LSFP with hedging curve. The experimental 
mean μ Exper. of 64,35  is close to the theoretical mean μ Theor.  of 64,34. The theoretical 
variance s2 Theor and experimental variance s
2 Exper.are 7,6 and 9,16 respectively, whereas the 
theoretical standard deviation s Theor. and experimental standard deviation s Exper are 2,8 and 
3,1 respectively (See Table 2). Therefore, it is necessary to include hedging in the contract 
which allows for realistic and fair price adjustment. This leads us to the graphical Monte 
Carlo simulation results of the LFSP curve with hedging and therefore lesser risk for the 
shipyard due to the mechanism for adjusting the final price during the construction of the 
vessel due to market changes in the price of material such as steel (See Figure 3).  
  
Fig. 3 Lump sum fixed price (LSFP) curve with hedging 
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In the LFSP curve with hedging, the risk is reduced for the shipyard and also for the 
owner. For instance, the contract price value which represents the most likely value of 64,34 
million USD is a more realistic situation with the ever changing market and its effect on the 
cost of materials as well as inflation, currency flucatuations, and uncertain project changes 
which all drive up the cost of building the prototype vessel. The theoretical mean μ Theor, and 
the experimental mean are both 64.34. The theoretical variance s2 Theor  is 7,6 whereas the 
experimental variance s2 Exper is  9,16. The theoretical standard deviation s Theor is 2,8 while 
the experimental standard deviation s Exper is 3,1 (See Table 2 and Figure 3).   
 
Fig. 4 Cost plus incentive fee (CPIF) curve 
 
For the CPIF curve, the theoretical mean μ Theor, and experimental mean μ Exper are 
very close, 59,21 and 59,82 respectively while there are slightly bigger differences between 
the theoretical and experimental standard deviations and variances. The theoretical and 
experimental standard deviations are  s Theor 8,6 and  s Exper  9,55;  and the variances are s
2 
Theor 74,2 and s
2 Exper 98 (See  Table 2 and Figure 4). These greater variance and standard 
deviation values mean that there is a broader array of contract price possibilities than with the 
LFSP with hedging contract. However the mean value of 59,82 which is lower than the 64,34 
value of the LFSP contract with hedging is beneficial for the owner and the shipyard in 
comparison to the LFSP with hedging contract because it gives more incentive for the 
shipyard to apply a PWBS system with better control of its man-hours. In this way the 
shipyard and sub-contractors keep costs to a minimum while simultaneously enabling an 
increase in their profit sharing.  
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Fig. 5 Cost plus fixed fee (CPFF) curve 
For the CPFF curve the theoretical and experimental means are μ Theor 57,65 and 57,96 
respectively. The theoretical and experimental standard deviations are s Theor 11,5 and s Exper 
13,18, while the theoretical and experimental variances s2 Theor 131,3 and s
2 Exper 169,2 (See 
Table 2 and Figure 5). The span of values for the CPFF curve is even greater than that of the 
CPIF and LSFP curves. However, the mean value is somewhat smaller than the CPIF value of 
59,82. Therefore, when then is less incentive to bring costs down, the price of the vessel will 
likely be larger. This is less beneficial for the owner, but good for the shipyard that is 
engaging in a prototype shipbuilding project.  
4.2 Monte Carlo simulation results 
The LSFP curve without hedging is the model that Croatian shipyards have been using till 
2008.  Since it does not allow price adjustment in the volatile market, it is no longer 
recommended in shipbuilding projects or any other Large Engineering Construction Projects. 
LSFP with hedging allows for price adjustment.  It is ideal for shipyards that are contracting 
vessels, which they have much experience in building, and allows for adjustment of contract 
price based on possible fluctuations in the price of steel or other main components such as 
main machinery engine. Likewise the fluctuations in the exchange rate of major world 
currencies such as the US dollar or the Euro can also be taken into account in this type of a 
contract. CPIF is ideal for shipyards trying to contract special vessels, which are not built in 
large series, and in which there is a learning curve. CPFF is similar to CPIF, except that the 
profit is always fixed.  This model is ideal for the contracting of special prototype vessels 
which shipyards have little or no experience in building. Therefore the risk for the shipyard is 
minimized while guaranteeing a minimal profit.  
5. Application to a shipbuilding contracting problem 
Considering the situation of a shipyard contracting a prototype vessel which has never 
before designed or built, it is necessary to determine which contract type is optimal both for 
the shipyard and the purchaser. Shipyards are facing decreasing order books. The case of a 
shipyard, which has built special naval vessels in the past, but in the recent past has mainly 
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built passenger ferries wishes to move into the area of contracting sophisticated factory 
trawlers. The estimations for material (steel, main-engine, outfitting equipment) and 
production (man-hours) and overhead costs are made. Standard type vessels such as tankers, 
container ships, and even RO-RO vessels are already saturated by many yards in the Far East 
with whom it is simply hard to compete due to the smaller prices. However shipyards not 
producing large series of vessels need to compete for the building of state of the art vessels for 
continually emerging markets such as sophisticated factory trawlers and other special mission 
type vessels for offshore purposes such as servicing wind farms which are not ordered in large 
series and require the use of modern contracting methods in order to minimize and balance the 
risk between the stakeholders while delivering the vessel to the owner that meet owner and 
classification society requirements at a competitive price [18], [19], [20].  
6. Conclusions 
The LSFP contract without hedging should generally not be used anymore by shipyards 
because they are inherently risky.  This was the method of contracting in Croatian shipyards 
till 2008. The LSFP contract with hedging is the latest trend.  However, it is the optimal 
contract only in instances where the vessel is one that is very well understood by the 
engineers, workers and management of the shipyard.  Prototype vessels, which were never 
built in Croatian shipyards, should not be contracted with this model, because the risk would 
be too high. The CPIF contract allows for a large range of contract price adjustment. The 
shipyard profit is also adjustable.  For projects where the shipyard is subcontracting work, this 
contract model is optimal as is the case for accomodation fabrication and outfitting since the 
subcontractor has the incentive to keep costs minimal and is rewarded with a greater profit. 
The CPFF contract is similar to the CPIF contract, except that the profit for the shipyard is 
minimized.  However, this contract is optimal for the contracting of complicated prototype 
vessels, where a shipyard needs to minimize risk, while ensuring a minimal profit. In this way 
the shipyard maintains survivability during a recession in the world shipbuilding market.   
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Nomenclature 
LSFP - lump sum fixed price   
LECP - large engineering construction project  
CPIF - cost plus incentive fee  
CPFF - cost plus fixed fee  
CGT - compensated gross tonnage  
P - profit  
PT - target profit  
PC - cost related profit  
C - actual cost to build the vessel  
CT - target cost to build the vessel  
CC - contract cost   
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